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11. Introduction
The collective consumption model explicitly recognizes that group (e.g. household) consump-
tion is the outcome of multi-person decision making, with each individual decision maker (e.g.
household member) characterized by her or his own rational preferences. Following Chiap-
pori (1988, 1992), it regards rational group consumption as the Pareto e¢cient outcome of
a within-group bargaining process. This collective approach contrasts with the conventional
unitary approach, which models groups as if they were single decision makers. The fact that
the collective approach starts from individual preferences (and not group preferences) makes it
particularly useful for addressing welfare-related questions that specically focus on the within-
group distribution of the group income.
For example, the targeting view of Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) takes as a starting
point that the e¤ectiveness of a specic benet or tax also depends on the particular group (e.g.
household) member to whom it has been targeted; and these authors argue that a unitary set-
up, which implicitly assumes income pooling at the aggregate group level, fails to adequately
deal with such targeting considerations. In addition, the collective model allows for analyzing
welfare at the individual group member level rather than at the aggregate group level; for
example, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006 ) suggest a collective approach for comparing
the cost-of-living of individuals living alone with that of the same individuals living in a multi-
member household. Finally, a concept that is intrinsically related to the collective approach
is the so-called sharing rule, which divides the aggregate group means over the individual
group members. Recovering this sharing rule, and subsequently explaining its variation in
terms of group (member) characteristics, can yield useful insights into the distribution of the
within-group bargaining power across the individual group members; see, for example, Browning,
Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994 ), Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and
Ekeland (2006 ).
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007) recently established a nonparametric revealed
preference characterization of a collective consumption model that considers general prefer-
ences of the individual group members, which allow for consumption externalities and public
consumption within the group.1 They introduced a testable necessary condition and a testable
su¢cient condition for data consistency with the collective consumption model that only require
price and quantity data pertaining to the aggregate group level; these conditions have a simi-
lar formal structure as the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) condition for the
unitary model (Varian, 1982, building on Afriat, 196 7). These nonparametric conditions allow
for t es t ing consistency of observed group behavior with collective rationality. By contrast, the
empirical analysis of the welfare-related questions listed above requires recoveryof the decision
structure underlying the observed (aggregate) group behavior.
This paper focuses on the nonparametric analysis of recovery questions that are relevant for
the collective model. More specically, we explore whether the structural collective consump-
1Browning and Chiappori (1998) originally suggested this collective consumption model, and established
its parametric characterization; see also Chiappori and Ekeland (2006 ) for additional discussion. Browning,
Chiappori and Lewbel (2006 ) recently proposed a collective consumption model that explicitly accounts for
economies of scale within the process of household consumption. Our model (implicitly) includes such economies
of scale that follow from public consumption and consumption externalities.
2tion model (i.e. individual preferences, individual consumption and the sharing rule) can be
recovered on the basis of observed group behavior alone (i.e. aggregate quantities and prices).
The recovery methodology that we present consequently enables the nonparametric analysis of
welfare-analytical questions that are specic to the collective consumption model. Nonpara-
metric recovery typically aims at identifying the set of structural models that are consistent
with a given set of observations. The corresponding recovery questions are essentially the non-
parametric counterparts of the so-called identication questions in the parametric literature;
see Chiappori and Ekeland (2005) for a general discussion on parametric identication for the
collective model. To illustrate the di¤erence between parametric and nonparametric recov-
ery/ identication, let us consider the unitary model. For that model, parametric identication
aims at recovering the (structural model) parameters of a pre- speci ed utility function repre-
senting u niq u e preferences from a set of demand (reduced form) parameters that are estimated.
By contrast, from a nonparametric perspective, there usually are many preferences that are
consistent with the same set of data satisfying the unitary GARP condition. Therefore, non-
parametric recovery of the unitary model focuses on identifying the set of preferences that are
consistent with a given data set; see, for example, Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982 and 2006).
The main purpose of the current paper is to develop similar set identication results for the
collective model. In fact, given that this collective model includes the unitary model as a special
case (i.e. when there is a single group member/ decision maker), we also complement the existing
literature on nonparametric recovery within the context of the unitary model.
In what follows, we will make the distinction between special cases and the general case
of the collective model. The special cases impose specic a priori structure on the group
behavior: (1) the case in which all goods are publicly consumed, and (2) the case in which all
goods are privately consumed and there are no consumption externalities. For these cases, we
establish conditions that can be tested on the basis of the available (aggregate) price and quantity
data and that are simultaneously necessary and su¢cient for data consistency with collective
rationality. In turn, these necessary and su¢cient conditions allow for full nonparametric
recovery of the collective model. Interestingly, these results comply with those of Chiappori and
Ekeland (2005), who consider similar special cases to obtain identication (or more precisely
identiability) within a parametric context. As we will discuss, our treatment of these special
cases allows for a number of useful extensions, such as: nonparametric testing and recovery for
the hybrid case in which some goods are publicly consumed while all other goods are privately
consumed without externalities; forecasting collective consumption behavior in new situations;
and testing specic hypotheses regarding the collective decision process. Next, the general case
does not impose a priori structure and thus allows for public consumption and externalities of
any good. For this case, we develop a necessary condition for collective rationality that can be
tested on the available data. And we subsequently argue that this necessary condition provides a
useful basis for nonparametric recovery of the sharing rule underlying observed group behavior.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 recaptures the nonparametric condition
for collective rationality. We extend the discussion of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007)
by including the possible use of assignable quantity information (which is often partly, but
not fully, available in budget surveys). This characterizes collectively rational group behavior in
terms of feasible personalized prices, personalized quantities and income shares (representing
the underlying sharing rule). Section 3 considers the special cases mentioned above. For these
cases, we develop (necessary and su¢cient) tests for data consistency with collectively rational
3behavior that merely involve mixed integer linear programming (MILP), which is attractive for
practical applications. Subsequently, we address the recovery issue and discuss the possibility
to identify (through MILP) the sets, and corresponding upper and lower bounds, of feasible
personalized prices, personalized quantities and income shares that are consistent with collec-
tively rational group behavior; these results parallel the results on nonparametric preference
recovery for the unitary model. Additional assignable quantity information generally entails
tighter bounds; but, as we will show, precise recovery (i.e. tight bounds) can be obtained even
if no assignable quantity information is available. Section 4 addresses the testing issue for the
general case; we introduce a (necessary) test for data consistency with collectively rational
consumption behavior which can be implemented through integer programming (IP). Section 5
considers the corresponding recovery issue, and demonstrates the possibility to identify (through
MILP) bounds on the feasible income shares without imposing specic a priori structure on the
collective model. Still, recovery of feasible personalized quantities and prices remains impossible
for the general case, which again falls in line with the results of Chiappori and Ekeland (2005) on
parametric identication. Section 6 summarizes and o¤ers some concluding remarks regarding
the practical application of the proposed methodology. The appendix contains the proofs of our
main results.
2. Rational collective consumption behavior
This section introduces the nonparametric characterization of the collective model that con-
siders general preferences of the group members, which impose minimal a priori structure on
the consumption externalities and public consumption within the group. Starting from this
nonparametric characterization, Section 3 addresses testing and recovery of special cases of this
general model, which include additional structure on the nature of the members preferences.
Sections 4 and 5 subsequently return to (testing and recovery of) the general model that is
presented here.
2.1. Individual pref erences
We consider an M-member group. The group purchases the (non-zero) n-vector of quantities
q 2 Rn
+ with corresponding prices p 2 Rn
++. All goods can be consumed privately, publicly or
both. For example, car use may be partly public (e.g. car use for a family trip) and partly
private (e.g. car use for work). In addition, as for the privately consumed quantities, we allow













with qm 2 Rn
+ the private consumption quantities of member m with out externalities (i.e. that do
not enter the utility function of at least one other member), Qm 2 Rn
+ the private consumption
quantities of member m withexternalities (i.e. that do enter other members utility functions),
and Qh 2 Rn
+ the publicly consumed quantities.
Note that not only the quantities Qh but also the quantities Qm may be interpreted as public
consumption, given that they enter other members utility functions. To simplify notation, we







M+1 in the following. No qualitative distinction can
be made between the di¤erent components of Q. Yet, there is a clear quantitative di¤erence:
group members may accord another marginal valuation to private consumption Qm than to
public consumption Qh. Our use of the simplied notation Q rather than
 
Q1;:::;QM;Qh
also falls in line with the argument of Chiappori and Ekeland (2006), who state that privateness
(versus publicness) of consumption has no testable implication per se if no additional information
(on assignable quantities; see below) is used.
Formally, we assume that preferences of each member m can be represented by a non-satiated
utility function Um (qm;Q) that is non-decreasing in its arguments. Given the construction of
Q, this e¤ectively accounts for public consumption within the group and (positive) consumption
externalities.
2.2. Assignable quantities
We start from T observations of group consumption quantities under di¤erent price regimes. For
each observation t we use pt and qt to denote the observed prices and aggregate quantities. In
general, for each qt we do not observe its constituent components qm
t and Qt. If we observe how
much a group member consumes of a particular good, then we say this good is assignable; see
Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2006). In this paper, we consider assignab le quantities
that specically relate to private quantities without externalities (qm
t ); these quantities can be
assigned to a single members utility function, which is no longer the case if externalities are
possible. Of course, in practice such assignable quantities necessarily involve an assumption
that preference externalities are e¤ectively absent. Note further that it may well be that we
have such assignable quantity information for only a subset of group members rather than for
all members. Chiappori and Ekeland (2005), considering general collective consumption models,
which also includes private consumption, argue that such assignable quantity information (on
qm
t ) is necessary for obtaining identiability. More specically, they show that it is necessary
for parametrically recovering the underlying structure of the consumption model (i.e. member
preferences and decision process) from the groups aggregate consumption behavior alone. In
the following, we will argue that the use of assignable quantity information can (often consid-
erably) enhance the power of the nonparametric analysis. Still, we will also demonstrate that
precise nonparametric recovery is sometimes possible even if no assignable quantity information
is available.
For each observation t, we dene the (observed) assignab le quantities qAm
t 2 Rn
+ for member







Our following discussion focuses on a set of observations SA = f(pt; qt; qA1
t ;:::; qAM
t ); t =
1;:::;Tg. The superscript A in SA refers to the fact that this set includes assignable quantities.
We note that, in our general case, for some goods it may well be that only parts of the consumed
quantities are assignable (e.g., car use for work can be assignable while car use for a family trip
is clearly not).
Let us consider some specic examples. For simplicity, we focus on two-member households
(M = 2) consisting of a wife (member 1) and a husband (member 2):





t . For example, Bonke and Browning (2006) discuss a data set on
household consumption that could be used in this case. Importantly, given our specic
assumption of assignable quantities (which -to recall- pertains to private consumption
without externalities), such a full assignability assumption excludes public consumption
and consumption externalities (because Qt = (0;:::;0;0)); i.e. group members are of the
so-called egoistic type.
A specic application of this example setting includes an observation t of member ms
consumption behavior when deciding alone (rather than in group): e.g., for the wife as
member 1, this corresponds to qA1
t = qt if the full consumption quantity can be assigned
to the wife in situation t. Note that such an application implies that we assume that
individual egoistic preferences do not change when deciding in group (e.g. when living in
a multi-member household) or when deciding alone (e.g. when living apart); for instance,
one may assume constant preferences for the wife (husband) in a couple and the same
wife (husband) as a widow(er) (compare with Michaud and Vermeulen, 2006). In fact,
the testing tools presented below e¤ectively allow for testing such a constant preference
assumption.




Generally, this intermediate case includes settings characterized by assignable goods as
well as non-assignable goods, which can be characterized by externalities as well as public
consumption. For instance, a model that is often considered in the literature excludes,
like before, public consumption and consumption externalities (Qt = (0;:::;0;0)) while,
di¤erent from before, it only uses quantity information on a so-called exclusive good
for each household member (i.e. an assignable good that is exclusively consumed by
the wife or the husband; see Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori, 2006). A specic
application is Chiapporis (1988) labor supply model with egoistic household members;
in that setting, each household members leisure is the exclusive good while the other,
Hicksian consumption good is non-assignable.
3. A nal example implies no assignable quantity information, i.e. qAm
t = 0. In that case,
there are no restrictions on qm









). This includes the setting in which all goods, even if
assignable, can be characterized by externalities. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007)
established nonparametric empirical restrictions for collectively rational group behavior in
this scenario, which imposes minimal a priori restrictions.
2.3. Collective rationality
To dene the collective rationality condition, we focus on feasible decompositions of the aggregate
quantities qt in terms of qm
t , the private quantities that only enter member ms utility function,
and Qt, the private and public quantities that enter other members utility functions: Specically,
we dene feasible personalized quantities b qt, which capture such feasible decompositions of qt.
6Denition 1. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be as et o fo b s er v a ti o n s .Fo rea c h






s a ti s f y qm
t  qAm
t , m =





















Example 1 illustrates the concept.
Example 1. Co n s i d eratwo - memberh o u s eh o l d( M = 2)wi thawi f e ( member1)a n dah u s b a n d
( member2)th a t c o n s u mesth r ee g o o d s( n = 3) . S u p po s e twoo b s er v a ti o n swi th a g g r eg a te
q u a n ti ti es
q1 = (3;5;4 )
0 a n dq2 = (4 ;3;5)
0 ;
















































Using the concept of feasible personalized quantities, we can dene the condition for a collec-
tive rationalization of a set of observations SA, which basically requires that the observed group
consumption can be represented as a Pareto e¢cient outcome of some within-group bargaining
process.
Denition 2. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be as et o fo b s er v a ti o n s .A c o mb i -
n a ti o no fM u ti l i tyf u n c ti o n sU1;:::; UM p r o v i d esacollective rationalization o fSA i ff o rea c h


































m=1 Zm+ Zh)]  p0
tqt a n dzm  qAm
t :
Thus, a collective rationalization of SA requires that there exists, for each observation t with
assignable quantities qAm
t , feasible personalized quantities b qt that maximize a weighted sum of
the group members utilities Um for the given group budget p0
tqt: This optimality condition
re ects the Pareto e¢ciency assumption regarding observed group consumption in the collective
model. Each weight m
t represents the bargaining power of member m in observation t: See
also Browning and Chiappori (1998) for a detailed discussion.
Clearly, assignable quantity information restricts the feasible set of utility functions Um and
bargaining weights m
t in Denition 2. And thus, intuitively, additional assignable quantity
information will yield more stringent nonparametric conditions for collective rationality. In
turn, these stronger conditions will entail more powerful nonparametric recovery results. We
will repeatedly illustrate this in the sequel.
72.4. Nonparametric condition
We next establish a nonparametric condition for a collective rationalization of a set SA. To






for observed aggregate prices pt,









; and the interpretation of the di¤erent components is as follows. As for
the rst M components, the personalized prices equal the observed prices for member ms own
private consumption quantities without externalities (i.e. p
m;m
t = pt for the quantities qm
t ), while
they equal zero for the other members private consumption quantities without externalities (i.e.
p
m;l
t = 0 for the quantities ql











captures the fraction of the price for the quantities Qt that is borne by member m: for each
separate component of Qt the corresponding personalized prices can be interpreted as Lindahl
prices and must add up to the observed prices. More specically, feasible personalized prices
P
m;l
t , l = 1; :::; M, pertain to private quantities with externalities and feasible personalized
prices P
m;h
t to public quantities. Summarizing, we get the following formal denition.
Denition 3. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of observations. For each



















t = pt, p
m;l




















t for c = 1;:::;M;h:
Example 2 illustrates the concept.
Example 2. We recapture the situation of Example 1 . Suppose the corresponding observed
prices
p1 = (1;3;2)
0 and p2 = (2;1;3)
0 :













































































;t = 1;:::;Tg; (2.1)
note that a given set of observations SA generally enables multiple specications of b SA.
Using the notation b SA we can specify the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP),
which we translate towards our specic setting. Varian (1982) introduced the GARP condition
for individually rational behavior under observed prices and quantities; i.e. he showed that
it is a necessary and su¢cient nonparametric condition for maximizing a single non-satiated
utility function under a given budget constraint. We focus on the same condition in terms of
8feasible personalized prices and quantities; we will establish that collective rationality as dened
in Denition 2 requires GARP consistency for each individual member m.2






;t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of feasible personalized prices
and quantities. I f (b pm
s )
0 b qs  (b pm
s )
0 b qt then b qs Rm
0 b qt ( b qs is directly revealed preferred to b qt
by member m );and if b qs Rm
0 b qu; b qu Rm
0 b qv; :::; b qz Rm
0 b qt for some (possibly empty) sequence
(u; v ; :::; z ) then b qs Rm b qt ( b qs is revealed preferred to b qt by member m ). The set f(b pm
t ;b qt);
t = 1;:::;Tg satises GARP if (b pm
t )
0 b qt  (b pm
t )
0 b qs whenever b qs Rm b qt.
Remark that, if the group consists of only a single member (M = 1), then b SA = f(pt;qt);
t = 1;:::;Tg and Denition 4 coincides with the usual GARP condition for individually rational
behavior. In fact, that GARP condition for individually rational behavior can also be interpreted
as the nonparametric condition for the unitary household consumption model, which -to recall-
treats the household as if it were a single decision maker. This fact that the unitary model can
be conceived as a special case of the general collective model (i.e. for M = 1) also appears from
the next proposition, which provides a nonparametric characterization of collectively rational
behavior.
Proposition 1. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of observations. The
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a combination of M concave and continuous utility functions U1; :::; UM that
provide a collective rationalization of SA;
(ii) there exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities b SA such that for each member
m = 1; :::; M the set f(b pm
t ;b qt); t = 1;:::;Tg satises GARP;
(iii) there exists a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities b SA, numbers Um
j > 0 and

m






0 (b qs   b qt) for each member
m = 1; :::; M.
Condition (ii) states that collective rationality requires individual rationality (i.e. GARP
consistency) of each member m in terms of personalized prices and quantities; condition (iii)
gives the equivalent Afriat inequalities (see Varian, 1982, for extensive discussion in the context
of the unitary model). In general, however, the true personalized prices and quantities are
unobserved. Therefore, it is only imposed that there must exist at least one set of feasible
personalized prices and quantities b SA that satises the condition. In what follows, we will
mainly focus on condition (ii).
Example 3 illustrates the result. This example shows consistency with the condition in Propo-
sition 1 for a data set with two observations. In Section 4 (Example 8), we will give an example
with two observations that rejects collective rationality in terms of the condition in Proposition
1 for M = 2; this shows that two observations are su¢cient for rejecting collective rationality
in terms of the condition in Proposition 1. The possibility to reject collective rationality with
two observations essentially depends on the available assignable quantity information. Indeed,
2Slightly abusing notation, but for ease of exposition, we use (b pm
s )























9Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007) show that, if no assignable quantity information is
used (qAm
t = 0 for each observation t and each member m), then rejecting collective rationality
requires at least three observations (for M = 2).
Example 3. We recapture the situation of Examples 1 and 2, with corresponding observed
prices and aggregate quantities. We can verify that this data set satises the condition in
Proposition 1. For example, consider the set of feasible personalized prices and quantities b SA
with b q1 and b q2 specied in Example 1 and (b p1
t; b p2
t) specied in Example 2. For these feasible
quantities and prices we have that (b p1
1)0b q1(= 13) > (b p1
1)0b q2(= 9 ) and (b p1
2)0b q2(= 10) < (b p1
2)0b q1(=
11); so from Denition 4it is easily veried that the rst member satises GARP. Analogously,
we nd that also the second member satises GARP: (b p2
1)0b q1(= 13) < (b p2
1)0b q2(= 14) and
(b p2
2)0b q2(= 16 ) > (b p2
2)0b q1(= 12). Since both members satisfy GARP for the given b SA, we
conclude that the condition in Proposition 1 holds, and thus that there exist utility functions
that provide a collective rationalization of this data set.
2.5. The sharing rule
Importantly in view of our further discussion, the result in Proposition 1 also allows for the
following decentralized interpretation of collective rationality: collective rationality at the group
level (for given SA) requires individual rationality at the member level (for some b SA). Given
this, collectively rational consumption behavior can also be represented as the outcome of a
two-step allocation procedure: in the rst step, the so-called sharing rule distributes the ag-
gregate group income across the group members; in the second step, each member optimizes
her/his utility subject to the resulting income share and accounting for the members personal-
ized prices. We remark that this decentralized representation of collectively rational behavior,
which follows from the Pareto e¢ciency assumption regarding the group bargaining process, is
formally similar to the well-known decentralization result regarding collective rationality when
consumption externalities and public consumption are excluded; see Chiappori (1988, 1992). An
important di¤erence of the approach followed in this paper is that each member ms preferences
may depend not only on her or his own private consumption, but also on the other members
private consumption as well as public consumption (implying that personalized prices can di¤er
from observed market prices).
In the rst step, the sharing rule denes the income shares that are allocated to the di¤erent
group members. Correspondingly, for a set of feasible personalized prices and quantities b SA
that obtains consistency with the collective rationality condition in Proposition 1, we can dene
feasible income shares b ym











;t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of feasible personalized prices
and quantities such that each set f(b pm
t ;b qt); t = 1;:::;Tg, m = 1; :::; M; satises GARP. For
yt = p0
tqt the group income at observation t, this set b SA denes a feasible income share for each
member m at prices pt as b ym
t = (b pm
t )
0 b qt:
Example 4 illustrates the denition.
10Example 4. We again consider the data set given in Examples 1 and 2. For the set of feasible
personalized prices and quantities b SA with b q1 a n db q2 s pe c i e dinEx a mp l e1a n d(b p1
t; b p2
t) s pe c i e d
in Ex a mp l e2 , weo b ta in b y1
1 = (b p1
1)0b q1 = 1 3 , b y2
1 = (b p2
1)0b q1 = 1 3 a n d b y1
2 = (b p1
2)0b q2 = 1 0 ,
b y2
2 = (b p2
2)0b q2 = 1 6 .Ob s e r v etha t b y1
1+ b y2
1 = y1 = 2 6a n db y1
2+ b y2
2 = y2 = 2 6 :
The second step of the allocation procedure then requires that the quantities b qt max imiz e
each member m s utilityunder the b udg et b ym
t (which,in our set- up,is endog enouslyde ned as
(b pm
t )






in b SA) . This corresponds to a separate GARP condition for each
set f(b pm
t ;b qt); t = 1 ;:::;Tg.
The sharingrule is a core concept in this two- step representation. I t can be interpreted
as an indicator for the b arg ainingpower of the indiv idual g roup members:a hig her relativ e
income share of member m (b ym
t = yt)is then reg arded as an indication of increased b arg aining
power for that member;see Browning ,Chiappori and Lewbel (2 0 0 6 ) . The sharingrule concept
is particularlyuseful in a welfare contex t,because it is independent of cardinal representations
of preferences (in contrast to the b arg ainingweig hts m
t in De nition 2 ) . Giv en this useful
interpretation,a main question in what follows concerns the nonparametric recov eryof feasib le
income shares. We will de ne bounds for the feasib le income shares that are independent of
the speci cation of the (data rationaliz ing )set b SA. I ntuitiv ely ,additional assig nab le quantity
information will g enerallyentail more powerful recov eryresults. But we will also show that
string ent bounds can be ob tained ev en if no assig nab le quantityinformation is av ailab le.
3. Special cases: testing and recovery
S o far,we hav e considered a collectiv e consumption model that accounts for g eneral utility
functions Um and thus allows for pub lic consumption and ex ternalities of anyg ood. For this
case,the necessaryand su¢cient condition for a collectiv e rationaliz ation in Proposition 1is
di¢cult to use in practice. More speci cally ,the member- speci c rev ealed preference relations
Rm







and quantities b qt. Giv en this,we  rst consider special cases of
the g eneral collectiv e consumption model presented in S ection 2 ;theyput additional ap r i o r i
structure on member- speci c utilityfunctions Um,which essentiallypertains to the nature of
the g oods in terms of ex ternalities and priv ate/ pub lic consumption. I n terms of the condition
in Proposition 1 ,for each g ood they xe i t h e rthe feasib le personaliz ed prices o rthe feasib le
personaliz ed quantities.
We will prov ide testab le necessaryand su¢cient conditions for collectiv e rationalityfor these
special cases. S tartingfrom these conditions, we can recov er the sharingrule, personaliz ed prices
and personaliz ed quantities that underlie the ob serv ed collectiv e choice behav ior. I n addition, we
can recov er,or  forecast ,behav ior in new situations. As we will discuss,such testing ,recov ery
and forecastingis possib le throug h mix ed integ er linear prog ramming(MI LP) ,with b inary(or
0 - 1 )v ariab les as the endog enouslyde ned integ er v ariab les.3 As such,practical applications can
use e¢cient solution methods that hav e been used for formallysimilar MI LP prob lems;see,for
3Closelysimilar integ er prog rammingcharacteriz ations hav e been sug g ested in the contex t of Arrov ian social
welfare functions. See,for ex ample,Sethuraman,Piaw and Vohra (2 0 0 3) .
1 1example, Nemhauser and Wolsey (1999) for a general discussion. Conveniently, e¢cient MILP
solvers have been included in many present-day optimization software pack ages.
To be precise, nonparametric recovery essentially denes upper and lower bounds on the
feasible income shares, personalized prices and personalized quantities that hold for all sets b SA
providing a collective rationalization of the data; if a specic feasible income share, personalized
price or personalized quantity respects these bounds, then there exists a corresponding set
b SA that collectively rationalizes the observed set SA. We illustrate the practical usefulness of
the proposed methodology by simple numerical examples. These examples show that precise
recovery results (i.e. tight bounds) can be obtained even if there are few observations and no
assignable quantity information is available. In practice, of course, we may generally expect
more precise recovery when more observations or assignable quantity information can be used.
3.1. Public consumption
In this section, we assume that all private consumption quantities qm (without externalities)
and Qm (with externalities) are zero, which implies q = Q
h. In terms of the general condition
for collective rationality in Denition 2, this means that we consider member-specic utility
functions Um (qm;Q) = V m  
Qh
= V m (q). It is worth emphasizing that this setting is more
general than may seem at rst sight. S tric to sensu, the mere implication is that the (observed)
aggregate quantities (f ul l y) enter all utility functions; in principle, this allows for private con-
sumption (with externalities) of a particular good e by member m as l ongas that g ood e is
ex c l usiv el yc onsumed bythat member m. Formally, when using (z)e as the e-th entry of a vector
z, (Qm)e = (q)e (and thus
 
Qh
e = 0) is empirically equivalent to
 
Qh
e = (q)e (and thus
(Qm)e = 0). This directly relates to our earlier remarkthat a quantitative but no qualitative
distinction can be made between the di¤erent components of Q. Further, if externalities are not
excluded and all goods are fully assignable (i.e. q =
XM
m=1 Qm and we observe all quantities
Qm), then an analogous argument obtains that the following method can also be used.
Because we assume that qt= Q
h
t for each observation t, we must focus on sets of feasible
personalized prices and quantities b SA with Qh
t= qt. As a result, the only relevant component
of the feasible personalized prices b pm
t is the vector P
m; h
t , which pertains to the publicly con-
sumed quantities. Given this, the nonparametric necessary and su¢cient condition for collective
rationality follows directly from Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be a set ofobservations. For
Um (qm;Q) = V m  
Qh
; m = 1; :::; M; there exists a combination ofM concave and con-
tinu ou s u tilityf u nctions U1; :::; UM that provide a collective rationalization ofSA ifand only













; t = 1;:::;Tg satises GARP:
Interestingly, this condition can be reformulated as requiring that the feasible set of a specic
MILP problem is non-empty. To see this, we dene the binary variables xm
st 2f0;1g, with xm
st = 1
interpreted as b qs Rm b qt for a given set of feasible personalized prices and quantities b SA. We
then have the following result.
12Proposition 2. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of observations. There













; t = 1;:::;Tg satises GARP if and only if there exist non-neg ative P
m;h
t , b ym
t and
xm
































qs  yt (1   xm
st).
The interpretation of the di¤erent personalized price (PP) constraints is the following. Rule
(PP-i) follows from Denition 3 of feasible personalized prices and rule (PP-ii) from Denition





0 qt, then we must have
xm
st = 1 (which corresponds to b qs Rm b qt).4 Rule (PP-iv) imposes transitivity, i.e. xm
su = 1 (b qs
Rm b qu) and xm
ut = 1 (b qu Rm b qt) imply xm
st = 1 (b qs Rm b qt). Finally, rule (PP-v) requires that,
if xm







qs. As such, Proposition 2 denes an operational
necessary and su¢cient test for collective rationality (under the assumption Um (qm;Q) =
V m  
Qh
): if the MILP constraints (PP-i)-(PP-v) characterize an empty feasible region for the
given data set, then a collective rationalization (with only public consumption) of the data is
impossible; conversely, if the MILP constraints characterize a non-empty feasible region, then a
collective rationalization of the data is certainly possible.
Given this characterization of collective rationality, we can recover upper and lower bounds
on feasible income shares and feasible personalized prices that provide a collective rationalization
of the set S. To dene the upper (or, conversely, lower) bound for the feasible income share of
member m, we solve the MILP problem that optimizes the obj ective ma xb ym
t (or mi nb ym
t ) subj ect
to (PP-i)-(PP-v). Similarly, to dene the upper (or lower) bound on the feasible personalized
price of an individual good e (1  e  n), we solve the MILP problem that optimizes the














) subj ect to (PP-i)-(PP-v).
Example 5illustrates the MILP test. It demonstrates that the proposed method can obtain
very tight bounds even when the number of observations is small (in casu T = 3); these tight
bounds can be recovered because there is a large variation in the observed prices and aggregate
quantities. In the general case, for a given price-quantity variation, we can -of course- expect
the bounds to become tighter when more information can be used (e.g. because T gets larger).
Such additional information can also include specic hypotheses about the decision structure
underlying observed group behavior (in casu the sharing rule or feasible personalized prices).
In fact, as also shown in Example 5 , our approach allows for testing such assumptions.







st is di¢cult to use in MILP. Therefore, in practice we can






qt +   ysxm
st for  (> 0) arbitrarily small. A similar qualication applies to the
constraint (PQ-iv) in Proposition 3.
13Example 5. Consider a two-member household (M = 2) that consumes three goods (n = 3).
S uppose three observations with aggregate q uantities and prices (for 0 < < 1)5
q1 = (1;0;0)
0 ;p1 = (1 +  ;1; =2)
0 ;
q2 = (0;1;0)
0 ;p2 = (1;1 +  ; =2)
0 ;
q3 = (0;0;1)
0 ;p3 = (0:5+  =2;0:5+  =2;1)
0 :
As a preliminary step, we note that these prices and q uantities imply
y1 = 1 +  ; p
0
1q2 = 1; p
0
1q3 =  =2;
y2 = 1 +  ; p
0
2q1 = 1; p
0
2q3 =  =2;
y3 = 1; p
0
3q1 = 0:5+  =2; p
0
3q2 = 0:5+  =2:
Step 1. We rst consider the restrictions on the binary variables x1
st and x2
st (s;t 2 f1;2;3g,
s 6= t) for the current data. As a rst result, we must have x1
st = 1 or x2
st = 1 for any s and t.






















Combining these two constraints, and using that ps=P1;h
s +P2;h















and thus, because ys > p0
sqt, we necessarily have x1
st = 1 or x2
st = 1 for any s and t.
As a second result, we obtain that xm
st = 1 implies xl
ts = 1 (m;l 2 f1;2g; m 6= l) for any s
and t. S pecically, for xm
















t , yt = b y1
t + b y2










qs, and thus x
l
ts = 1 because of rule (PP-iii).
As a third result, we cannot have x1
st = 1 and x2
st = 1 for any s and t. I f x1
st = 1 and x2
st = 1,






















t , yt = b y1





5To emphasize, we use zero quantities for mathematical elegance. Of course, this use of zero quantities does
not a¤ect the core of our arguments in this and following examples.
14which is excluded because yt > p0
tqs.
As a fourth result, we cannot have (i) xm
21 = 1 and xl
31 = 1 or (ii) xm
12 = 1 and xl
32 = 1
(m 6= l): For example, consider xm
21 = 1 and xl
31 = 1. (The argument for xm
12 = 1 and xl
32 = 1 is






















which is excluded because y1 > p0
1 (q2 + q3) and, by construction, p0













Given these four results, we necessarily obtain xm
13 = xm
12 = xm




31 = 1. It is easily veried that this specication satises the necessary and su¢cient condition
in Proposition 2, i.e. the corresponding feasible region dened by rules (PP-i)-(PP-v) is non-
empty.















q2, which hold by construction), we obtain
x
m




3q1 = 0:5 + =2 ) b y
l
3 = y3   b y
m
3  0:5   =2;
x
l




3q2 = 0:5 + =2 ) b y
m
3 = y3   b y
l
3  0:5   =2;
or, when  becomes arbitrarily small we obtain very tight bounds (around 0 .5 ) for the feasible
income shares b y1









2q3 = =2 ) b y
l
2 = y2   b y
m
2  1   =2;
x
l




1q3 = =2 ) b y
m
1 = y1   b y
l
1  1   =2;
which again obtains tight bounds for b ym
t and b yl
t (t = 1;2) when  gets small. For example, 
arbitrarily close to zero yields b ym
1  1, b yl
1  0 and b ym
2  0, b yl
2  1.
Two remark s are in order. First, this result has a clear interpretation in terms of the
 bargaining powerof the individual members, for which the sharing rule can be interpreted as
an indicator. Specically, consider  arbitrarily small. In that case, member m can be conceived
as the (quasi)  dictatorin situation 1 (i.e. member m is solely responsible for the full household
budget or b ym
1  y1) while the other member l is the  dictator in situation 2 (b yl
2  y2); in situation
3 , nally, the aggregate income is split equally over the two members (b y1
3  b y2
3  0:5y3).
Second, the proposed method allows for imposing a whole series of additional restrictions
on the sharing rule (or, alternatively, for testing specic hypotheses about the sharing rule).
Such restrictions preserve the MILP structure as long as they are expressed in linear form. For
instance, suppose that in our current example we impose (or assume) that the feasible income
share of the wife (member 1) is higher than that of the husband (member 2) in situation 1, i.e.
b y1
1  b y2
1. This immediately obtains 1 =2  b y1
1  1, 0  b y2
1  =2 and 0  b y1
2  =2, 1 =2 
b y2
2  1;and, thus, for  arbitrarily small the mere restriction b y1
1  b y2
1 implies that the wife is
the  dictatorin situation 1 (b y1
1  y1) and the husband is the  dictatorin situation 2 (b y2
2  y2).
15Alternatively, one can put upper and lower bounds (or test corresponding assumptions) on the
relative income share of some member m in situation t, i.e. ym
t  b ym
t =yt  ym
t for ym
t , ym
t 2 [0;1] ;
the linear nature of these constraints is consistent with the MILP formulation given above. For
instance, our result implies that any lower bound ym
t > =2 for some m and all t will be rej ected
for this specic data structure. Finally, additional sharing rule restrictions can impose a specic
relationship between feasible income shares of the same member m in di¤erent situations (e.g.
time periods). For instance, suppose that we assume in the current example that the feasible
income share of the wife must be higher in situation 1 than in situation 2, i.e. b y1
1  b y1
2; this
directly obtains 1   =2  b y1
1  1, 0  b y1
2  =2 and 0  b y2
1  =2, 1   =2  b y2
2  1.
Step 3. Let us then consider recovery of the feasible personalized prices. As a starting point,
we use our conclusion for the feasible income shares, which can be summarized as
1   =2  b y
m
1  1 and 0  b y
l
1  =2;
0  b y
m
2  =2 and 1   =2  b y
l
2  1;
0:5   =2  b y
1
3  0:5 + =2 and 0:5   =2  b y
2
3  0:5 + =2:
For the given data structure, this implies (using (PP-ii))












































 0:5 + =2:














when  gets arbitrarily small. To














, i.e. the wife
contributes more to the rst good in situation 1. For  arbitrarily small, this mere restriction















 (p2)2); nally, in















3.2. Private consumption without externalities
In this section, we consider the specic case that excludes externalities and public consumption
(Qt = (0;:::;0;0)); i.e. all goods are private and group members are of the egoistic type.
In terms of the general condition for collective rationality in Denition 2, this means that we
consider member-specic utility functions Um (qm;Q) = V m (qm). At this point, it is worth
noting that this case actually also encompasses a wider class of member-specic utilities that
model altruism in a specic way: it also includes so-called caring preferences, which corre-
spond to utility functions Um (qm;Q) = W m  
V 1 (q1);:::;V M  
qM
that depend not only on
member ms own egoistic utility but also on the other member ls utility dened in terms of
ql. Chiappori (1992) argues that every Pareto e¢cient outcome in terms of caring preferences
16(W m) is also Pareto e¢cient in terms of egoistic preferences (V m). In other words, under Pareto
e¢ciency the empirical implications of caring preferences are indistinguishable from those of
egoistic preferences.
As a preliminary note, we recall that under the stated conditions, which imply Qt =
(0;:::;0;0) for the feasible personalized quantities, any set b SA of feasible personalized prices

























We will show that collective rationality imposes additional restrictions on the personalized
private quantities that can imply (substantially) tighter bounds than those in (3.2). We will also
demonstrate that very tight bounds can be obtained even if no assignable quantity information
is available.
Like before, we rst formulate the necessary and su¢cient condition for collective rationality
that is relevant in the present case. This condition follows directly from Proposition 1.
Corollary 2. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of observations. For
Um (qm;Q) = V m (qm); m = 1; :::; M; there exists a combination of M concave and con-
tinuous utility functions U1; :::; UM that provide a collective rationalization of SA if and only if
there exist feasible personalized quantities b qt with qt=
PM
m=1 qm
t such that for each member m
the set f(pt;qm
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg satises GARP:
Once more, we can reformulate this condition as requiring that the feasible set of a specic
MILP problem is non-empty. This is contained in the following result.
Proposition 3. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of observations. There
exist feasible personalized quantities b qt with qt=
PM
m=1 qm
t such that for each member m = 1;
:::; M the set f(pt;qm




























s  yt (1   xm
st):
The di¤erent personalized quantity (PQ) constraints have a similar interpretation as the
personalized price (PP) constraints in Proposition 2. Rules (PQ-i) and (PQ-ii) repeat the
constraints in (3.1). Rule (PQ-iii) follows from Denition 5 of feasible income shares. Rule
17(PQ-iv) implies that, if b ym
t  p0
sqm
t , then we must have xm
st = 1 (which corresponds to b qs Rm
b qt): Rule (PQ-v) imposes transitivity. Finally, rule (PP-vi) requires that, if xm








qs. As such, Proposition 3 denes a necessary and su¢cient condition
for collective rationality (under the assumption Um (qm;Q) = V m (qm)) that can be tested
through MILP. Given this characterization, we can dene upper and lower bounds on feasible
income shares and feasible personalized quantities by solving MILP optimization problems. For
example, an upper (or, conversely, lower) bound on the feasible personalized quantity of an
individual good e (1  e  n) is obtained by optimizing the objective max(qm
t )e (or min(qm
t )e)
subject to (PQ-i)-(PQ-vi).
Example 6 illustrates the result. It demonstrates that the proposed method can obtain
very tight bounds when the number of observations is small. In addition, it shows that such
tight bounds can be obtained for the feasible personalized quantities even if no assignable quan-
tity information is available. Analogously to before, additional information can include specic
hypotheses regarding the group decision process (e.g. the sharing rule and the assignable quan-
tities). Again, our approach e¤ectively allows for testing such assumptions.
Example 6. We recapture the situation of Example 5, with corresponding observed prices and
aggregate quantities. This example does not include assignable quantity information, so that
(PQ-ii) does not add information.
As for the feasible income shares, an analogous reasoning as in Steps 1 and 2 of Example 5
yields the conclusion (for m 6= l)
1   =2  b y
m
1  1 and 0  b y
l
1  =2;
0  b y
m
2  =2 and 1   =2  b y
l
2  1;
0:5   =2  b y
1
3  0:5 + =2 and 0:5   =2  b y
2
3  0:5 + =2:
Focusing on the feasible personalized quantities, this implies (using (PQ-iii))
1   =2  (1 + )(q
m













2  =2 and 1   =2  (1 + )(q
m
2 )2  1;












3  0:5 + =2:
We thus obtain
(1   =2)=(1 + )  (q
m













2  =(2(1 + )) and (1   =2)=(1 + )  (q
m
2 )2  1=(1 + );












3  0:5 + =2:






t when  gets arbitrarily small. To illustrate
the impact of additional structure, suppose that (q1
1)1 > (q2
1)1, i.e. the wife consumes more of
the rst good in situation 1. For  arbitrarily small, this sole restriction immediately obtains
that the wife consumes (quasi) everything of the rst good in situation 1 ((q1
1)1  (q1)1), while
the husband consumes everything of the second good in situation 2 ((q2
2)2  (q2)2); nally, in




To conclude, we indicate that the previous methodology allows for a number of interesting
extensions. As illustrated in our examples, it enables us to test specic hypotheses regarding
the collective decision process (e.g. on the sharing rule, in Example 5). In what follows, and
without being exhaustive, we point out three additional applications. Because we believe the
formal analogy with the previous discussion is fairly easy, we restrict to sketching the main
arguments.
1. The previous discussion on testing and recovery restricted to (i) the case without private
consumption (with recovery of feasible personalized prices) and (ii) the case without ex-
ternalities and public consumption (with recovery of feasible personalized quantities). In
practice, intermediate cases may also be considered. In this respect, it is worth emphasiz-
ing that arguments directly analogous to those given above apply to the case in which we
can a priori identify each good as either exclusively publicly consumed or exclusively pri-
vately consumed (without externalities). (Importantly, if we want to obtain similar MILP
formulations as before, no good can be partly privately consumed (without externalities)
and partly publicly consumed.)
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2 . An ot h e r i n t e re s t i n gap p li c at i onc on c e rn st h ere c ov e ry ,or  fore c as t i n g  ,of i n d i v i d u al me m-
be rs  c on s u mp t i on( an dt h u sals o ag g re g at eg rou pc on s u mp t i on )i na n e w s i t u at i ond e  n e d
i nt e rmsof n e w p ri c e spN an dg rou pi n c omeyN. For e x amp le ,t h i sallowsu st o c omp are
i n d i v i d u al c on s u mp t i onan dt h eb arg ai n i n gpowe r of s omeme mbe r m ( c ap t u re db yb ym
t = yt
for e ac hs i t u at i ont)i nalt e rn at i v e( ob s e rv e dan dn e w)s i t u at i on s . To i n t rod u c et h i sap p li -
c at i on ,were c ap t u ret h ec as et h ate x c lu d e se x t e rn ali t i e san dp u b li cc on s u mp t i on ,wh i c h
c orre s pon d st o Um (qm;Q) = V m (qm);t h i sallowsu st o d e v e lops i mi lar MI LP formu la-
t i on sasbe fore .
Es s e n t i ally ,weh av et o c on s t ru c tt h es e tof fe as i b lepe rs on ali z e dq u an t i t i e sqm
N t h atme e t
yN = p0
NqN for ag g re g at eg rou pd e man dqN =
XM
m=1 qm
N,s u c ht h ate ac hs e tf(pt;qm
t );
t = 1 ;: : : ;Tg [f(pN;qm
N)g s at i s  e sGARP;e v e ryfe as i b les pe c i  c at i onof t h eqm
N d e  n e s
fe as i b lei n c omes h are sb ym
N = p0
Nqm
N. Th eMI LP c h arac t e ri z at i on of t h es e tof fe as i b le
1 9personalized quantities qm
N 2 Rn
+ and feasible income shares b ym
N 2 R+ is then a direct
extension of the one in Proposition 3. We remark that this MILP formulation easily
includes alternative prior assumptions regarding the consumption quantities in the new
situation. For example, we can restrict the proportions of the group quantities that will
be consumed by the individual group members (e.g. in a two-member household, such a
restriction can impose that a particular good is exclusively consumed by the husband);
this boils down to imposing additional constraints of the form m  qN  qm
N  m  qN
for m; m 2 Rn
+: Generally, such additional restrictions preserve the MILP structure as
long as they are expressed in linear form.
3. A nal extension involves recovering the behavior of some member m in a new situation
dened in terms of new prices pN and a given utility level (i.e. the same utility level for
member m as the initially observed bundle qI, I 2 f1;:::;Tg). In such an application, the
recovered bounds on the feasible income shares can subsequently be used for constructing
member-specic cost-of-living indices (corresponding to the prices pN and the same utility
level as qI for m); compare with Varian (198 2), Blow and Crawford (20 0 1) and Blundell,
Browning and Crawford (20 0 3), who conduct nonparametric cost-of-living analyses in a
unitary setting. For example, this may be useful for comparing the cost-of-living of indi-
viduals living alone with that of the same individuals living in a multi-member household;
compare with Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (20 0 6 ), who address such a question by
using parametric methods.
Again, we consider the situation without externalities or public consumption. In this
case, we need to characterize the feasible personalized quantities qm
N (which dene feasi-
ble income shares b ym
N = p0
Nqm
N for member m) that simultaneously meet the following
conditions:(i) the set f(pt;qm
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg [ f(pN;qm
N)g must satisfy GARP; (ii) for
member m the quantities qm
N must be equally good as those corresponding to the initial
bundle qI. Once more, the MILP formulation of condition (i) follows immediately from





Nt:the rst constraint implies xm
sN = 1 if xm
sI = 1 (which complies with b qs
Rmb qN if b qs Rmb qI), and the second constraint requires xm
Nt = 1 if xm
It = 1 (b qN Rmb qt if b qI
Rmb qt). Using this characterization, we can dene bounds on the feasible income shares
(b ym
N) and the feasible personalized quantities ((qm
N)e for some good e) by solving MILP
problems. Lik e before, we can also include alternative prior assumptions regarding the
consumption quantities in qm
N; such additional restrictions preserve the MILP structure as
long as they are expressed in linear form.
4. The general case: testing
We next turn to the general collective consumption model dened in Denition 2, which accounts
for public consumption and externalities of any good. For this case, we do not observe the true






o rthe feasible personalized
quantities b qt. This is in sharp contrast with the special cases in S ection 3; for the condition
in Proposition 1, it excludes developing an equivalent MILP formulation similar to the ones in






and b qt, and each such specication implies di¤erent restrictions in terms of the
relations Rm
0 and Rm.
Therefore, in the following we focus on testable restrictions on Rm
0 and Rm that are directly
expressed in terms of observed prices and quantities, and that do not refer to a specic b SA. This
obtains a testable necessary condition for data consistency with the general collective model
which solely uses the prices and quantities that are e¤ectively observed; this condition extends
the necessary condition of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007 ) by accounting for assignable
quantity information. Consistent with our (MILP-based) approach in Section 3, we show that
this necessary condition can be reformulated in integer programming (IP) terms, which is again
attractive for practical applications. In addition, as we will discuss in Section 5, it provides a
useful basis for sharing rule recovery in the case of the general collective consumption model.
4.1. A preliminary result
Before introducing our testable necessary condition, we present a lemma that provides the
starting point of our approach. It implies that we can start from the set SA for specifying
restrictions on Rm
0 . Moreover, the equivalence results imply that we cannot do better when
using only the set of observations SA (rather than a specic b SA).
Lemma 1. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be as et o fo b s er v a ti o n s .Fo ra n ys
a n dt,we h a v e th e f o l l o wi n gtwoeq u i v a l en c e r es u l ts( f o rm 2 f1;:::;Mg) :
(i)
h






(ii) f o rm:
h
b qsRm















Rule (i) does not use assignable quantity information and pertains to the Pareto e¢cient
nature of group behavior in the collective model; for M = 2 , it equals Lemma 1 of Cherchye,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2007 ). Specically, if the group has chosen qs when qt was equally
available (p0
sqs  p0
sqt), then we always have that, independently of the specication of the set
b SA, at least one group member m must prefer the former (personalized) quantities to the latter
(i.e. b qs Rm
0 b qt); the identity of member m depends on the specication of b SA that is used.
Rule (ii) does use assignable quantity information, and shows that this e¤ectively allows us
to assign preference relations to an individual group member m; such assignable relations for
member m hold for a ny specication of b SA. It uses that, by construction, (b pm
s )































0 b qs  (b p
m
s )
0 b qt for any b S
A;
and it follows from this last inequality that b qs Rm
0 b qt for any b SA. In words, the minimal
(assignable) expenditures of member m in observation s exceed the maximal expenditures
of that member for bundle t (under the prices ps), which implies that member m reveals




t , which implies qm
t = qAm





t and, thus, all member-specic preference relations are assignable.
21Rule (ii) implies that assignable quantity information implies additional empirical restrictions
as compared to the limiting case with qAm
t = 0 for each m and t (i.e. no assignable quantity
information, so that only rule (i) can be used). To illustrate, we consider Example 7, which shows
that assignable quantity information allows for recovering preference relations Rm
0 even if rule (i)
is not applicable. This suggests that, in general, the use of assignable quantity information can
obtain a testable condition for collective rationality that is stronger than the one that is solely
based on rule (i), which was originally presented by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007).
Consequently, such assignable information can entail a more powerful empirical analysis. The
more stringent testable condition will be discussed next.
Example 7. Consider a two-member household (M = 2) with a wife (member 1) and a husband
(member 2) that consumes three goods (n = 3). S up pose two observations with aggregate
quantities and p rices
q1 = (4;2;2)
0 ;p1 = (4;5;1)
0 ;
q2 = (2;4;2)

















We then obtain p0
1qA1






(= 11) and thus, on the basis of rule (ii) in
Lemma 1 , we can conclude b q1 R1
0 b q2 for every set b SA;i.e., for every feasible speci cation of the
personaliz ed p rices and quantities  b q1 is directly revealed p reference to b q2by the wife. On the
other hand, we have p0
1q1(= 28 ) < p0
1q2(= 30), and so we cannot use rule (i) (to conclude b q1
Rm
0 b q2, m = 1 or 2, for any set b SA).
4.2. Testable necessary condition
The basic idea of our testable condition is to formulate restrictions on feasible specications
of the relations Rm
0 and Rm, which are expressed in terms of the observed information summa-
rized in the set SA. Such feasible specications are then referred to as hypothetical relations.
Specically, we specify qs Hm
0 qt if we hypothes iz e b qs Rm
0 b qt; Hm denotes the transitive closure
of the relation Hm
0 : We say that a collective rationalization of the data in the sense of Denition
2 is impossible if there does not exist a feasible specication of these hypothetical relations
that satises the restrictions dened in the following Proposition 4 . This denes a necessary
condition for collectively rational behavior as characterized in Proposition 1. In addition, as
we will discuss, it implies an operational test for data consistency with the general collective
consumption model.6
6We note that rules (iv) and (v) rene rules (iii) and (iv) originally dened by Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen (2007, Proposition S3); the new rules (iv) and (v) strengthen the original rules (iii) and (iv) in that
they imply them as a special case.
22Proposition 4. Suppose that there exists a combination of M utility functions U1; :::; UM
that provide a collective rationalization of the set of observations SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t );
t = 1;:::;Tg. Then there exist hypothetical relations Hm
0 and Hm, m = 1;:::;M, such that:
(i) if p0
sqs  p0
sqt, then qs Hm











, then qs Hm
0 qt;
(iii) if qs Hm
0 qu; qu Hm
0 qv; :::; qz Hm
0 qt for some (possibly empty) sequence (u; v ; :::; z ), then
qs Hm qt;






and for all m 2 M we have
qtk(m) Hm qs for some k (m)  M*, then qs Hl
0 qtk for some l = 2 M and k  M*;






and for all m 2 M we have
qtk(m) Hm qs for some k (m)  M* 1, then qs Hl
0 qtM* for some l = 2 M;
















Hence, a collective rationalization of the set SA requires that there exists at least one speci-
cation of the relations Hm
0 and Hm consistent with rules (i)-(vii) in this proposition. Of course,
in general there may be multiple feasible specications of Hm
0 and Hm that obtain consistency
with rules (i)-(vii).
Let us then interpret the di¤erent rules in Proposition 4. First, rules (i) and (ii) follow
immediately from Lemma 1, when replacing the relations Rm
0 by their hypothetical counterparts
Hm
0 : Next, rule (iii) denes the transitive closures Hm of the relations Hm
0 :
The interpretation of the remaining rules (iv) to (vii) pertains to the very nature of the
collective model, which -to recall- explicitly recognizes the multi-person nature of the group
decision process. Rules (iv) and (v) compare qs to (combinations of) M di¤erent bundles qtk.
First, rule (iv) expresses that, if all members m 2 M prefer some qtk(m) over qs for the (sum)
bundle
PM*
k=1 qtk not more expensive than qs, then the choice of qs can be rationalized only if
another member l = 2 M prefers qs over some qtk. Next, rule (v) expresses that, if (aggregate)
qs is more expensive than the (sum) bundle
PM*
k=1 qtk, while each member m 2 M prefers qtk(m)
(with k (m)  M* 1) over qs, then the only possibility for rationalizing the choice of qs is that
another member l = 2 M prefers qs over the remaining bundle qtM*.
Rules (i) to (v) dene restrictions on the relations Hm
0 and Hm. For a specication of these
relations, rules (vi) and (vii) dene the corresponding upper cost bound conditions. Rule (vi)
complements rules (iv) and (v). It states that, if each member m prefers qsk(m) (k (m)  M*)
over qt, then the choice of qt can be rationalized only if it is not more expensive than the
(sum) bundle
PM*
k=1 qsk. In this expression, we can have M* < M because it is possible that
sk(m) = sk(l) for l 6= m (i.e. members m and l both prefer the same bundle qsk(m) (= qsk(l)) over
qt).
Finally, rule (vii) reveals that the assignable quantity information makes it possible to for-
mulate separate upper cost bound conditions for the individual group members, whereas the
23upper cost bound dened by rule (vi) corresponds to all members simultaneously. More specif-
ically, rule (vii) expresses that, if member m prefers qs over qt, then the latter choice can be











An important observation is that the condition in Proposition 4 is empirically rej ectable, i.e.
we can nd data that do not satisfy the condition. Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007)
provide such an example for the case when there is no assignable quantity information (qAm
t = 0
for each m and t). They show that, in such a situation, M +1 observations and M +1 goods are
both necessary and su¢cient to rej ect the general collective consumption model for M-member
group behavior.
Example 8 provides an illustration that uses assignable quantity information; it obtains
rej ection of collective rationality with two observations (T = 2) for a two-member household
(M = 2). In fact, when assignable quantity information is available, then in general it su¢ces to
have two observations and goods to rej ect collective rationality of M-member group behavior.




t and thus qm
t = qAm
t ), the condition in Proposition 4 boils down to GARP





; t = 1;:::;Tg corresponding to each member m; and this is








t (for some m and t;s), which requires only two
goods and two observations. This again illustrates that, in general, more assignable quantity
information will entail more powerful results.
Example 8. We recapture the situation of a household with two members and three goods in
Example 7 . This specic data structure implies q1 H1
0 q2 because of rule (ii). But then rule
(vii) is not met because p0
2qA1






(= 8). Thus, we conclude a violation of
the condition in Proposition 4 .
4.3. I nteger programming f ormulation
In this section, we show that the necessary condition in Proposition 4 can be reformulated in IP
terms, which is attractive from an operational point of view. As a preliminary step, we dene
the binary variables aM[s;t1;:::;tM*], bm[s;t] 2 f0;1g (for m;M* 2 f1;:::;Mg, s;t 2 f1;:::;Tg)
and ft1;:::;tM*g  f1;:::;Tg:




sqtk and aM*[s;t1;:::;tM*] = 0 otherwise;










and bm[s;t] = 0 otherwise.
These variables capture the available information that is used in rules (i)-(vii) of Proposition
4. We next formulate these rules as IP constraints. To do so, we again dene the binary
variables xm
st 2 f0;1g. As we focus on the necessary condition, which is expressed in hypothetical
preference relations, xm
st = 1 must now be interpreted as qs Hm qt.




st  a1[s;t] and (I P- ii)xm
st  bm[s;t]:
The constraint (IP-i) implies that, if a1[s;t] = 1, then xm
st = 1 for some m. Similarly, the
constraint (IP-ii) implies that, if bm[s;t] = 1, then xm
st = 1:
24Rule (iii) corresponds to
(IP-iii) xm
su + xm




ut = 1 then xm
st = 1, which imposes transitivity.
To provide the IP formulation of rule (iv), for each combination (t1;:::;tM*) and any subset
M   f1;:::;Mg, we consider k (m)  M* for all m 2 M. Given this, rule (iv) complies with
(IP-iv) for each (t1;:::;tM*), M   f1;:::;Mg and correspondingly dened k (m)  M* for all










This imposes that, if aM*[s;t1;:::;tM*] = 1 and for all m 2 M we have xm
tk(m)s = 1, then we must
have xl
stk = 1 for some l = 2 M and k  M*.
Similarly, for rule (v) we consider k (m)  M* 1 for all m 2 M: Rule (v) then corresponds
to
(IP-v) for each (t1;:::;tM*), M   f1;:::;Mg and correspondingly dened k (m)  M* 1 for all








The interpretation is that, if aM*[s;t1;:::;tM*] = 1 and for all m 2 M we have xm
tk(m)s = 1, then
for the remaining tM* we must have xl
stM* = 1 for some l = 2 M.
Next, to dene the IP formulation of rule (vi), for each M* we consider every combination
(sk(1);:::;sk(M)) with k (m)  M* for all m 2 M; note that we can have k (m) = k (l) (m 6= l)
so that M*  M. Given this, rule (vi) is equivalent to
(IP-vi) for each (sk(1);:::;sk(M)) with k (m)  M* for all m :
PM
m=1 xm










, it species that, if for each m we have xm
sk(m)t = 1,
then it must be that aM*[t;s1;:::;sM*] = 0 (using that k (m)  M* for all m).
Finally, rule (vii) complies with
(IP-vii) xm











This imposes that, if xm
st = 1, then it must hold that bm[t;s] = 0. It species an upper cost
bound condition for each individual member m.
As such, testing consistency with collective rationality requires checking whether the con-
straints (IP-i)-(IP-vii) characterize a non-empty feasible region (for xm
st 2 f0;1g). Every feasible
specication of the binary variables xm
st corresponds to a specication of the relations Hm con-
sistent with rules (i)-(vii) in Proposition 4.
To conclude, we provide the simple numerical Example 9 as an illustration.
7For completeness, we note that the inequality constraint in (IP-vi) can equivalently be formulated as
PM
m=1 xm
sk(m)t  M  as
M*[t;s1; : : : ; sM*] f o ras






M*[t;s1; : : : ; sM*] = 0
o t he r wi s e .Ana na l o g o usq ua l i c a t i o na ppl i e st o( I P- v i i ) .
2 5Example 9. We recapture the situation of a household with two members and three goods in
Ex amples 7and 8 .For this speci c data structure the ineq ualityp0
1qA1







11) implies b1[ 1; 2]= 1,and thus x1
12 = 1 because of ( I P- ii) . Giv en this,( I P- v ii)req uires
b1[ 2; 1]= 0 ,which contradicts p0
2qA1






(= 8 ): As such,we obtain an empty
feasible region and conclude that the condition in Proposition 4is v iolated.
4.4. Remar ks
As mentioned before, the necessary condition developed in this section extends the necessary
condition of Cherchye, De Rockand Vermeulen (20 0 7 ) by including the possible use of assignable
quantity information. This directly obtains that the necessary condition is in general not suf-
cient. The result follows from Example 2 of Cherchye, De Rockand Vermeulen (20 0 7 ):for
M = 2, it presents data (without assignable quantity information) that satisfy the condition but
cannot be collectively rationaliz ed in the sense of Proposition 1 . For general T, the condition
is su¢cient if all goods are fully assignable (qt =
XM
m=1 qAm
t , which implies qm
t = qAm
t ). In
addition, it is su¢cient if M = 1, when it reduces to the usual GARP condition for individually
rational behavior (see Varian, 1 9 8 2). (In fact, the same qualication holds for the conditions
in Propositions 2 and 3 .) In these cases, the feasible personaliz ed prices and quantities are all
observed.
We see at least the following arguments to motivate our focus on the necessary condition in
Proposition 4 . First, the condition is always su¢cient for T not  too large , which depends on
the number of members M and the assignable quantity information. For example, Cherchye, De
Rockand Vermeulen (20 0 7 ) argue that, for M = 2, it is su¢cient if T  4 and if no assignable
quantity information is available (qAm
t = 0 for each t and m);but, ceteris paribus, the condition
is no longer su¢cient for T = 5 . S imilar results can be derived for M > 2 and qAm
t 6= 0 for
some t and m.
Next, Cherchye, De Rockand Vermeulen (20 0 7 , Proposition S 4 ) present a testable su¢cient
condition for the general collective model, which can easily be adapted to the current set-up
with assignable quantity information. (Alternative su¢cient conditions for the general model are
those in Propositions 2 and 3 , which are necessary and su¢cient for special cases of the general
model.) Interestingly, these authors also provide a  convergenceargument for the case without
assignable quantity information, which states that the empirical implications of their su¢cient
condition generally come closer to those of the necessary condition in Proposition 4when the
sample siz e gets larger;i.e. both conditions become equally powerful for larger T. Again, this
convergence argument is easily adapted to account for assignable quantity information.
Another argument relates to the subtle di¤erence between  collectively rational household
behaviorand  data consistency with collectively rational household behavior : W hile inconsis-
tency with a necessary condition n ecessaril yimplies collectively irrational behavior, consistency
with a su¢cient condition in general does not imply collectively rational behavior; it o n l yimplies
data consistency with collectively rational consumption behavior. In other words, any su¢cient
condition only allows for  non-rej ection(but not for  acceptance ) of the collective rationality
hypothesis.
Finally, our focus on the necessary condition falls in line with the very nature of the nonpara-
metric approach that we follow, which typically focuses on the minimal (or  necessity ) empirical
restrictions that can be obtained from the available data. In S ection 5, we will argue that the
26necessary condition provides a powerful basis for recovering bounds on feasible income shares
that underlie the observed (collectively rational) group behavior. Specically, we derive bounds
that must be respected by any set b SA th at prov id es a collectiv e rationaliz ation ofth e d ata in the
sense of Proposition 1; this is a direct consequence of the fact that our recovery method starts
from a necessary condition (and not a su¢cient condition) for collective rationality.
5. The general case: recovery
In this section, we will show that the necessary condition in Proposition 4 allows for sharing
rule recovery in the case of the general collective consumption model, and that such recovery
is possible through MILP. As a preliminary remark, we indicate that our use of a necessary
condition for collective rationality as a starting point entails a subtle di¤erence with the recovery
results in Section 3, which were based on necessary and su¢cient conditions for (special cases of)
collective rationality. In particular, a specic feasible income share for member m that respects
the upper and lower bounds that we will characterize must no longer necessarily correspond to
a set b SA that collectively rationalizes the data. Such necessary correspondence is only the case
when the necessary condition is also su¢cient; see also our discussion at the end of Section 4.
Still, we believe that the bounds that we will present do provide useful information, even when
the necessary condition is not su¢cient: in our opinion, the fact that they necessarily bound
each feasible income share for member m that is dened by a data rationalizing set b SA is the
more important property in view of practical applications.
5.1. An i ndependence result
Before addressing recovery of the sharing rule, we argue that the necessary condition in Propo-
sition 4 provides a useful basis for recovery. To do so, we show that, if assignable quantity
information can be used, this necessary condition for M = M0 with M0 > 1 is independent
of the GARP condition for the unitary model, which -to recall- coincides with the collective
rationality condition for M = 1 (i.e. individual rationality): data consistency with the nec-
essary condition for M0 members is neither necessary nor su¢cient for data consistency with
the unitary GARP condition. Because Varian (1982) used this unitary GARP condition for
addressing recovery questions in the unitary setting, we believe this convincingly motivates our
use of the necessary condition as a basis for (in casu sharing rule) recovery in the case of the
general collective consumption model.
Example 10 illustrates the independence result by presenting (i) data that do not satisfy
the individual rationality condition for M = 1 while they do pass the necessary condition
for M = 2 and (ii) data that satisfy the individual rationality condition for M = 1 but not
the necessary condition for M = 2; similar examples can be conceived for any M0 > 1. As
such, considering additional members should not necessarily imply a weaker test; the necessary
condition for multi-member collective rationality should not have weaker empirical implications
than the GARP condition for individual rationality if there is assignable quantity information.
(In this respect, it is also worth recalling that the GARP condition for individual rationality
coincides with the necessary condition in Proposition 4 for M = 1.)
At this point, we note that Chiappori (1988; Examples 1-2 on p. 76-77) obtains a similar
independence conclusion for his collective labor supply model in the case of egoistic agents.
27The approach followed in this paper (including Example 10) claries that the independence
essentially relates to the assignable quantity information that is available (in Chiapporis Ex-
amples 1-2, this information pertains to observed leisure of the individual household members
in combination with the assumption of egoistic preferences). In other words, if no assignable
quantity information is available, then we do have that data consistency with the necessary
condition for M0 members is always necessary for data consistency with the GARP condition
for 1 member; but this is no longer the case if we can assign private consumption quantities
(without externalities) to individual household members.
Example 10. As a rst illustration, we recapture the data (observed prices and aggregate
quantities) in Examples 1and 2 . On the one hand, Example 3concludes that these data satisfy
the necessary and su¢cient condition in Proposition 1(and thus also the necessary condition
in Proposition 4) when using the corresponding assignable quantities for M = 2;in words,
a data rationaliz ation in terms of  two-member rationalityis possible. On the other hand,
it is easily veried that these data do not satisfy the unitary GARP condition (i.e. there
is a single decision mak er and, thus, b SA = f(pt;qt); t = 1;2g). S pecically, we have that
p0
1q1(= 26 ) > p0
1q2(= 23 ) while p0
2q1(= 23 ) < p0
2q2(= 26 ), which obtains the result. This shows
that, in general, consistency with the necessary condition for M0 (M0 > 1) members does not
necessarily imply consistency with the unitary GARP condition.
As a second illustration, we recapture the data (observed prices and aggregate quantities)
in Example 7. On the one hand, Examples 8 and 9conclude that these data do not satisfy the
necessary condition in Proposition 4 when using the corresponding assignable quantities for M
= 2;in words, a data rationaliz ation in terms of  two-member rationalityis impossible. On
the other hand, it is easily veried that these data do satisfy the unitary GARP condition.
S pecically, we have that p0
1q1(= 28) < p0
1q2(= 3 0) and p0
2q2(= 28) > p0
2q1(= 22), which gives
the result. More generally, this shows that, with assignable quantity information, consistency
with the unitary GARP condition does not necessarily imply consistency with the necessary
condition for M = M0 with M0 > 1.
Given this indepence and the fact that Varian (1982) used the unitary GARP condition
for unitary recovery, we conclude that the necessary condition in Proposition 4 provides a
powerful basis for nonparametrically addressing sharing rule recovery. An important result in
our following discussion is that this condition can obtain precise recovery even if no assignable
quantity information is available. Still, at this point we want to stress that we do -of course-
expect assignable quantity information to yield important value-added in practical applications.
Specically, the foregoing discussion makes clear that additional assignable quantity information
generally yields a more stringent necessary condition, which in turn obtains more precise recovery
results. For brevity, we will not explicitly illustrate recovery with assignable quantity information
in what follows, but we believe the analogy with the example that will be given (without
assignable quantity information) is fairly straightforward.
5.2. Sharing rule recovery
Essentially, we dene bounds on the feasible income shares b ym
t dened in Denition 5 in terms of
the feasibility restrictions implied by the necessary condition in Proposition 4. As a preliminary
28step, we recall the denitional fact XM
m=1 b y
m
t = yt; (5.1)







;t = 1;:::;Tg. Combination of (5.1) with ql
t  qAl
t for all l denes trivial upper



















and, of course, these initial bounds will generally be tighter when more assignable quantity
information is available. In the following, we will show that collective rationality (summarized
in terms of the necessary condition in Proposition 4) implies additional restrictions on the income
shares b ym
t that, in general, can imply (substantially) tighter bounds than those dened in (5.2).
To sketch the basic idea, we rst consider a specic set b SA and specify the restrictions on
feasible income shares b ym
t that are implied by the corresponding relations Rm (without explicitly
considering the corresponding specication of prices b pm
t and quantities b qm
t in b SA). For the given
set b SA, Denition 4 requires b ym
t = (b pm
t )
0 b qt  (b pm
t )
0 b qs whenever b qs Rm b qt. Using (b pm
t )








































, this obtains an upper bound on
the income share b ym








in (5.2). Next, similarly constructed upper bounds for b yl
t (l 6= m) dene a lower bound for b ym
t
that can be higher than the trivial lower bound p0
tqAm
t in (5.2).
In practice, we do not observe a specic b SA and corresponding relations Rm; but the approach
developed in Section 4 allows for dening restrictions on feasible specications of the Rm, which
we dened in terms of the hypothetical relations Hm (Proposition 4). Similar to before, we avoid
using a specic b SA. That is, we replace the relations Rm by their hypothetical counterparts Hm
in the above argument and, consequently, consider specications of the hypothetical relations
Hm that are consistent with the rules (i)-(vii) in Proposition 4. Starting from our earlier IP
formulation of the necessary condition, we reformulate the hypothetical relations Hm in terms
of the binary variables xm
st 2 f0;1g (with, to recall, xm
st = 1 interpreted as qs Hm qt). This
obtains the following result.
Proposition 5. Let SA = f(pt;qt;qA1
t ;:::;qAM
t ); t = 1;:::;Tg be a set of observations. For any
set b SA that satises condition (ii) in Proposition 1, the corresponding feasible income shares
b ym


















 yt (1   xm
st);
29for xm
st 2 f0;1g consistent with (IP-i)-(IP-vii).
In this result, the fact that we consider xm
st 2 f0;1g consistent with (IP-i)-(IP-vii) implies
that we focus on feasible income shares dened by hypothetical relations Hm that meet rules
(i)-(vii) in Proposition 4. Given this, the interpretation of the sharing rule (SR) constraints
is as follows. First, the constraint (SR-i) imposes (5.1) while the constraint (SR-ii) implies the
trivial bounds dened in (5.2); they are -of course- linear in nature. Finally, the constraint (SR-










st = 1 (which corresponds to qsHmqt). Similar
to before, given this characterization of the set of feasible income shares, one can dene upper
(or lower) bounds on the income share for each member m by solving the MILP problem that
optimizes the objective ma xb ym
t (or mi nb ym
t ) subject to (IP-i)-(IP-vii) and (SR-i)-(SR-iii).
Example 11 illustrates the result by recapturing the data structure of Examples 5 and 6,
which considered special cases of the collective model. Interestingly, even though we impose
minimal a priori structure (in terms of preferences and assignable quantity information), we get
exactly the same sharing rule bounds as in these special cases. This also shows that the proposed
method can yield very tight bounds even if no assignable quantity information can be used and
the sample is small. Of course, we can generally expect the bounds to become tighter when
more information can be used (including additional assignable quantity information and/ or more
observations). Like before, such additional information can also involve additional restrictions
(or testable assumptions) on the sharing rule; compare with our discussion of Example 5.
Example 11. We recapture the situation of Example 5 , with corresponding observed prices and
aggregate quantities. Since there is no assignable quantity information (qAm
t = 0 for m = 1;2
and t = 1;2;3), the trivial bounds in (SR-ii) merely imply 0  b ym
t  yt for each m and t and,
thus, (SR-ii) is redundant in view of (SR-i). As a preliminary step, recall that these prices and
quantities imply
y1 = 1 +  ; p
0
1q2 = 1; p
0
1q3 =  = 2;
y2 = 1 +  ; p
0
2q1 = 1; p
0
2q3 =  = 2;
y3 = 1; p
0
3q1 = 0:5 +  = 2; p
0
3q2 = 0:5 +  = 2:




tqs for all s;t = 1;2;3 we must have
qsHmqt and qtHlqs (t 6= s and m 6= l); this follows from rules (i) and (iv) in Proposition 4: On
the other hand, rule (vi) in Proposition 4 implies that we cannot have q2Hmq1 and q3Hlq1
(m 6= l) because p0
1q1 > p0
1 (q2 + q3); and, similarly, because p0
2q2 > p0
2 (q1 + q3) we cannot
have q1Hmq2 and q3Hlq2: Summarizing, we must always have q1Hmq3, q1Hmq2, q3Hmq2 and




32 = 1 and xl
23 = xl
21 = xl
31 = 1. It is easily veried (e.g. using the IP formulation) that this
specication satises the necessary condition in Proposition 4 (and we recall that this condition
is also su¢cient for T = 3 if there is no assignable quantity information).
Using (SR-i) and (SR-iii), this specication of the hypothetical relations implies
x
m




3q1 = 0:5 +  = 2 ) b y
l
3 = y3   b y
m
3  0:5    = 2;
x
l




3q2 = 0:5 +  = 2 ) b y
m
3 = y3   b y
l








2q3 = =2 ) b y
l
2 = y2   b y
m
2  1   =2;
x
l




1q3 = =2 ) b y
m
1 = y1   b y
l
1  1   =2:
This obtains tight bounds for b ym
t and b yl
t (t = 1;2;3) when  gets small. For example, 
arbitrarily close to zero yields b ym
1  1, b yl
1  0 and b ym
2  0, b yl
2  1, while b y1
3  b y2
3  0:5.
As a concluding remark, we indicate that the proposed method is not readily adapted for
recovering the feasible personalized prices and quantities for the general collective consumption
model under consideration. In fact, such non-recoverability applies for some good as soon as we
cannot identify it a priori either as exclusively privately consumed without externalities, or as
exclusively publicly consumed. (The other cases have been covered in Section 3.) To illustrate,
we consider such a good e that is privately consumed and characterized by externalities; we
exclude public consumption and private consumption without externalities to keep the argument
simple. For this good, neither the feasible personalized quantities ((Qm
t )e for each member m)
nor t he feas i bl e pers on al i z edp ri ces( (P
l ;m
t )e for each p ai r of membersm an dl) are  x edap ri ori .
Byu s i n gt he s hari n gru l e bou n d s , whi ch - t o recal l -cans t i l l be recov eredi nt hi scas e, t he met hod
s u bs eq u en t l yal l owsfor bou n d i n gt he p rod u ct(P
l ;m
t )e (Qm
t )e of t he feas i bl e pers on al i z edp ri ces




t )e. Ex amp l e 1 2i l l u s t rat est he arg u men t .
Example 12. We recapture the situation of Example 11, with corresponding observed prices








3 = 0 for t = 1 ;2;3.The conclusion of Example 11 then
implies
























3  0:5 +  = 2 and
























3  0:5 +  = 2;














3 )3.[ Evidently , directlysimilar arguments can be constructed for the goods 1 and 2 . ]
I n t eres t i n g l y ,t hi sl i mi t at i onof ou r met hodcomp l i eswi t h a s i mi l ar con cl u s i oni nt he p ara-
met ri c l i t erat u re ( s ee Chi ap pori an dEk el an d ,2 0 0 5 ,for a d et ai l edd i s cu s s i on ). I nt hatl i t erat u re,
ex i s t i n gres u l t sfai lt o obt ai n i d en t i  abi l i t y ( of t he d eci s i ons t ru ct u re u n d erl y i n gt he obs erv ed
col l ect i v e con s u mp t i onbehav i or) i nex act l yt he s ame cas esi nwhi ch ou r met hodfai l st o recov er
( s ep arat e bou n d son ) feas i bl e pers on al i z edp ri cesan dq u an t i t i es .
6. Summar y and c onc ludi ngr emar ks
We hav e ex t en d edt he n on p aramet ri c  rev eal edp referen cemet hod ol og yfor an al y z i n gcol l ect i v e
con s u mp t i onbehav i or, s o t hati tcanbe u s edfor emp i ri cal l yad d res s i n gwel fare- rel at edq u es t i on s
t hatare s peci  c t o t he col l ect i v e mod el . Fi rs t ,we es t abl i s heda n on p aramet ri c charact eri z at i on
of col l ect i v el yrat i on al behav i or t hati n cl u d est he pos s i bi l i t yt hatas s i g n abl e q u an t i t yi n format i on
3 1is available. Starting from this characterization, we have next presented nonparametric testing
and recovery tools for special cases of the collective model, which impose specic structure in
terms of consumption externalities and public consumption, as well as for the general collective
model, which imposes minimal a priori structure. We have shown that testing and recovery
is possible through integer programming (IP and MILP) with binary (or 0-1) variables as the
integer variables. Finally, while we have argued that additional assignable quantity information
generally yields more powerful recovery results, our examples also demonstrate that the proposed
methodology can obtain precise recovery even if no assignable quantity information is available.
Given all this, the next crucial step consists of bringing the proposed methodology to real-life
consumption data, to nonparametrically address the welfare-related issues listed in the intro-
duction. In this respect, two important remarks are in order. A rst remark relates to the
e¢cient implementation (in computational terms) of the methodology. We believe that the IP
and MILP formulations presented in the current paper convincingly show the computational
tractability of the methodology. Still, we also believe that, in practice, considerable e¢ciency
gains can be realized by exploiting the specicities of the collective rationality conditions;such
enhancements of the computational e¢ciency can be particularly useful when there are many
observations. For example, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2005) suggest e¢ciency en-
hancing mechanisms that exploit a number of basic theoretical insights regarding the collective
rationality tests;while these authors focus on the tests of collective rationality as they were orig-
inally proposed by Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007 ), the same insights -and, probably,
further renements- are readily adapted to the (testing and recovery) methodology presented
in this paper. Next, focusing on the specic IP/ MILP structure of the proposed testing and
recovery tools (with binary variables as the integer variables), one can conceive e¢cient solution
algorithms that are specially tailored for addressing the testing and recovery questions that are
relevant for the collective model;see, for example, the general discussion in Nemhauser and
Wolsey (19 9 9 ) on e¢ciently solving IP and MILP problems. Generally, we believe the develop-
ment of e¢cient testing and recovery algorithms constitutes an interesting avenue for follow-up
research.
The second remark that is relevant in view of practical applications pertains to the power
of the methodology that is proposed;this refers both to the probability of nonparametrically de-
tecting violations of collective rationality by means of the testing tools, and to the possibility of
providing tight bounds (on feasible income shares, personalized prices and personalized quanti-
ties) by means of the recovery tools. (See Andreoni and Harbaugh (2006 ) for a recent discussion
of the power of revealed preference tests and a survey of nonparametric power assessment tools
that are currently available.) While we have illustrated that the methodology can yield powerful
(recovery) results even if there is no assignable quantity information, we have also argued that
in general we can expect the power to increase (often substantially) when more assignable quan-
tity information is available. In our opinion, this pleads for investing in collective consumption
data sets that incorporate such information;such detailed data sets seem specially valuable for
nonparametric welfare analysis in terms of the collective consumption model. Next, the power of
the nonparametric methodology can be further increased by adapting the sequential maximum
power path idea of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003, 2006 ), who originally focused on
the GARP condition for the unitary model. Essentially, the approach of Blundell, Browning
and Crawford uses estimated Engel curves for given price regimes to construct virtual quantity
bundles that maximize the power of the nonparametric (testing and recovery) tools. When
32adapting this approach to the methodology presented in this paper, one can focus on Engel
curves for assignable quantities as well as on Engel curves for the aggregate household quanti-
ties. In our opinion, such extensions can be particularly valuable in view of real-life empirical
applications.
Appendix: proofs
Proof of Proposit ion 1
Varian (1982) has proven equivalence between conditions (ii) and (iii), so we can restrict to
proving equivalence between conditions (i) and (iii). This proof extends the proof of Proposition
1 of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007), who consider two-member households and do
not account for the possibility of assignable quantity information.



































t Um:8 An optimal solution to the above maximization problem must therefore satisfy





















t a subgradient dened for Qc and evaluated at Qc


























Next, concavity of the functions Um implies for each m
U
m (b qs)   U


















Substituting (6.1) in (6.2) and setting Um
k = Um (b qk) (k = s ;t) obtains condition (iii) of the
proposition.












m=1 Qm + Qh)]  p0
tqt and qm  qAm
t we can dene for all m
U










0 (b q   b qt)

: (6.3)
Varian (1982) proves that Um (b qt) = Um
t . Next, given m




















0 (b q   b qt)

:
Without losing generality, we concentrate on m
t = (1=
m














0 (q   qt);
for q = [
PM
m=1 qm + (
PM
m=1 Qm + Qh)]:
Since p0
tq  p0
































tqt and qm  qAm
t . We conclude that the functions Um in (6.3) provide a collective rationaliza-
tion of the set SA. These functions have the properties listed in condition (i) of the proposition
(compare with Varian, 1982).
Proof of Proposition 2






such that for each






; t = 1;:::;Tg satises GARP. Then the corresponding
specication of P
m;h
t , b ym
t and xm
st 2 f0;1g satises rules (PP-i)-(PP-v). First, rules (PP-i) and
(PP-ii) are satised because the feasible personalized prices and income shares are consistent
with Denitions 3 and 5. Next, to see consistency with rules (PP-iii)-(PP-v), consider any se-




















0 qz   
Pm;h
z
0 qt. (Trivially, another sequence does not impose restrictions on xm
st.) Rule (PP-iii) then
implies xm
su = xm
uv = ::: = xm
zt = 1, and rule (PP-iv) consequently obtains xm
st = 1. Rule (PP-v)











































0 qt (which corresponds to b qs Rm b qt).
2. Su¢ciency. If there exist P
m;h
t , b ym
t and xm
st 2 f0;1g that satisfy rules (PP-i)-(PP-v), then




















we have a sequence (u; v; :::; z) such that b qs Rm
0 b qu; b qu Rm
0 b qv; :::;
b qz Rm












qs: By construction, b qs Rm
0 b qu; b qu Rm


























0 qt. In terms
of the rules (PP-i)-(PP-v), this means that there always exists a sequence (u; v; :::; z) such that,
on the one hand, xm
su = xm
uv = ::: = xm
zt = 1 (because of (PP-iii)) and thus xm
zt = 1 (because of












qs and thus rule (PP-v) is violated.
In other words, there does not exist P
m;h
t , b ym
t and xm
st 2 f0;1g that simultaneously satisfy rules
(PP-i)-(PP-v).
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is directly analogous to that of Proposition 2.
Proof of Lemma 1
Rule ( i) :
1 . Ne c e s s ity . If for all sets b SA there exists m such that b qsRm
0 b qt, then p0
sqs  p0
sqt. We prove
e xab s u rd o. Suppose for all sets b SA there exists m such that b qsRm





sqt implies there exists at least one set b SA such that not b qsRm
0 b qt for
all m. More specically with an b SA such that (b pm
s )b qs = (p0
sqs)=M and (b pm
s )
0 b qt = (p0
sqt)=M.




























t = pt, p
m;l















t for all c: Given this, p0
sqs  p0
sqt implies for
any b SA there exists m such that (b pm
s )
0 b qs  (b pm
s )
0 b qt and thus b qsRm
0 b qt.
Rule ( ii) :
1 . Ne c e s s ity . b qsRm











e xab s u rd o. Suppose b qsRm





















implies there exists at least one set b SA
with not b qsRm
0 b qt: More specically with an b SA such that (b pm
s )
0 b qs = p0
sqAm
s and (b pm
s )






















0 b qs  (b pm
s )
0 b qt
for any b SA, and thus b qsRm
o b qt for any b SA.
35Proof of Proposition 4
Given that a collective rationalization of the set SA is possible, we consider a set b SA that is
consistent with condition (ii) in Proposition 1. Using Denition 4, this set b SA denes rela-
tions Rm
0 and Rm (m = 1;2): We will show that these relations (dened in terms of feasible
personalized quantities b qt) must satisfy the analogues of rules (i)-(vii) in Proposition 4. These
requirements carry over to the hypothetical relations Hm
0 and Hm (dened in terms of observed
quantities qt) specied in Proposition 4:a collective rationalization of the set SA is possible
only if there exists at least one specication of these hypothetical relations that is consistent
with these requirements.
Rules (i) and (ii): These rules follow directly from Lemma 1.
Rule (iii): This rule imposes transitivity.
Rule (iv): For all m 2 M we have b qtk(m) Rm b qs for k (m)  M*, which requires (b pm
s )
0 b qs 
(b pm
s )












0 b qs = p0






































0 b qtk for all k  M*, there must exist l = 2 M and








0 b qtk, or b qs Rl
0 b qtk.
Rule (v): For all m 2 M we have b qtk(m) Rm b qs for k (m)  M* 1, which requires (b pm
s )
0 b qs 
(b pm
s )




































0 b qs  p0
sqtM*. In turn, this implies that there








0 b qtM*, or b qs Rl
0 b qtM*.
Rule (vi): For all m we have b qsk(m) Rm b qt for some k (m)  M*, which requires (b pm
t )
0 b qt 
(b pm
t )





























Rule (vii): We have b qs Rm b qt, which requires (b pm
t )
0 b qt  (b pm
t )
0 b qs. By construction, we
have (b pm
t )
























Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is directly analogous to that of Proposition 2 (necessity part).
References
[ 1]Afriat, S. (1967),  The construction of utility functions from expenditure data , Interna-
tionalEconomic Rev iew 8, 67-77.
36[2] Andreoni, J. and W.T. Harbaugh (2006), Power indices for revealed preference tests, Uni-
versity ofW isconsin-Madison Department ofEconomics W ork ingPaper 2005-10, version
2006.
[3] Blow, L. and I.A. Crawford (2001), The cost of living with the RPI: Substitution bias in
the UK Retail Prices Index, Economic J ournal 111, 311-334.
[4] Blundell, R.W, M. Browning and I.A. Crawford (2003), Nonparametric Engel curves and
revealed preferences, Econometrica 71, 205-240.
[5] Blundell, R.W, M. Browning and I.A. Crawford (2006), Best nonparametric bounds on
demand responses, CeMMAP W ork ingPapers CWP 12/05, version 2006.
[6] Blundell, R., P.-A. Chiappori and C. Meghir (2005), Collective labor supply with children,
J ournal ofPolitical Economy 113, 1277-1306.
[7] Bourguignon, F., Browning, M and P.-A. Chiappori (2006), E¢cient intra-household al-
locations and distribution factors: implications and identication, CAM W ork ingPaper
2006-02.
[8] Browning, M, F. Bourguignon, P.-A. Chiappori and V. Lechene (1994), Income and Out-
comes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocations, J ournal ofPolitical Economy
102, 1067-1096.
[9] Browning, M. and P.-A. Chiappori (1998), E¢cient intra-household allocations: a general
characterization and empirical tests, Econometrica 66, 1241-1278.
[10] Browning, M., P.-A. Chiappori and A. Lewbel (2006), Estimating consumption economies
of scale, adult equivalence scales, and household bargaining power, Boston Colleg e W ork ing
Paper WP588, Department of Economics, Boston College, version 2006.
[11] Cherchye, L., B. De Rock and F. Vermeulen (2007), The collective model of household
consumption: a nonparametric characterization, Econometrica 75, 553-574.
[12] Cherchye, L., B. De Rock and F. Vermeulen (2005), Opening the black box of intra-
household decision-making: theory and non-parametric empirical tests of general collective
consumption models, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1603; CentER Discussion Paper No.
2005-51.
[13] Chiappori, P.-A. (1988), Rational household labor supply, Econometrica 56, 63-89.
[14] Chiappori, P.-A. (1992), Collective labor supply and welfare, J ournal ofPolitical Econ-
omy 100, 437-467.
[15] Chiappori, P.-A. and I. Ekeland (2005): The micro economics of group behavior: identi-
cation, University ofCh icag o W ork ingPaper.
[16] Chiappori, P.-A. and I. Ekeland (2006), The micro economics of group behavior: general
characterization, J ournal ofEconomic Th eory 130, 1-26.
37[17] Michaud, P.-C. and F. Vermeulen (2006), A collective labor supply model: identication
and estimation in the presence of externalities by means of panel data, RAND Labor and
Population Program WR-406, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation.
[18] Nemhauser, G.L. and L.A. Wolsey (1999), Integer and combinatorial optimiz ation, John
Wiley, New York.
[19] Sethuraman, J., T.C. Piaw and R.V. Vohra (2003), Integer programming and Arrovian
Social Welfare Functions, Mathematics of Operations Research 28, 309-326.
[20] Varian, H.R. (1982), The nonparametric approach to demand analysis, Econometrica 50,
945-972.
[21] Varian, H.R. (2006), Revealed preference, in M. Szenberg, L.Ramrattan and A.A. Gottes-
man (eds.), Samuelsonian economics and the 21st century, Oxford University Press.
38